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Abstract 
Previous research depicting the relationship between disgust sensitivity (DS) and 
political ideologies (PI) has found dissimilar results (i.e. Brenner & Inbar, 2014; as 
compared to Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009). Due to the discrepancy, the current 
study aims to determine whether analysing affective empathy (AE) and cognitive 
empathy (CE) as mediators of the relationship, will enhance the ability to predict PI 
from DS scores. The study employed a sample of 170 psychology undergraduates, 
with a mean age of 23.48 years (SD = 8.49), 81% of which were female. Constructs 
were measured using the Disgust Scale-Revised, Basic Empathy Scale – Adults, and 
the Australian Political Ideology Scale (developed as part of the study). Results 
indicate the possibility of an increasingly complex relationship between DS and PI, 
as a partial-mediation effect of AE was found, b = 0.24, 95%BCa CI [ .004, .760], 
representing a small completely standardised effect of 0.31, 95%BCa CI [.001, 
.0952]. No mediation effect was found for CE, b = -0.03, 95%BCa CI [ -.31, .19], 
with a negligible completely standardised effect, -0.003, 95%BCa CI [-.041, .024]. 
This may be evidence of a multifaceted relation between DS and PI, depicting an 
emotion-based, rather than cognition-based relation.  
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Our emotions play a vital role in numerous areas of our lives (Frijda, 2007).  
Emotion is pertinent in all significant events in a person’s life, drives behaviours, 
largely impacts on our wellbeing, and enables us to better describe our personalities 
(Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Even though the concept is central to human existence, its 
definition is yet to be agreed upon in the literature (Plutchik, 2001).  Many scholars 
have proposed differing, multi-dimensional theories of the concept of ‘emotion’. 
These diverging theories of emotion have independently evolved from psychological 
schools of thought, as well as academics external to the discipline of psychology (i.e. 
biological explanations; Plutchik, 2001). The inability of academics to agree upon a 
fixed explanation of the concept is a is a testament to its complexity. 
One of the many explanations of emotion derives from appraisal theorists 
who define emotion as a process, rather than a state (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & 
Frijda, 2013). The appraisal theory hypothesises that human emotion results from an 
evaluation of events, which elicit reactions differently in different people (Moors, 
2007). Appraisal theorists also describe emotions as adaptive responses which reflect 
an evaluation of the organism’s environment (Moors et al., 2013). The process is 
continuous. Changes in the components of an individual’s environment spur a relay 
of information and feedback in order to produce a single emotion, or sequence of 
emotional episodes (Moors et al., 2013). More broadly speaking, the appraisal 
process is the individuals’ assessment of the environment for their ability (or 
inability) to obtain goals. Often these goals aim to achieve self-preservation (Frijda, 
2007). In sum, emotions are necessary to reach the evolutionary goal of survival 
(Schaller, 2006). For example, disgust is an emotion necessary to protect oneself 
against contamination (Plutchik, 1980).  
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Emotions not only act as a function to ensure human survival, but also largely 
contribute to differences in human cognition and consequently the development of 
our beliefs, ideals and viewpoints (Oatley, Parrott, Smith, & Watts, 2011). Emotion 
is central to our understanding of cognition; it impacts upon attention, memory and 
decision making, as well as interpersonal interactions (Oatley et al., 2011). Emotion 
and cognition are often thought of as parallel systems in that one of the concepts 
impacts or alters the effects of the other (Oatley et al., 2011).  
Political Ideology and the role of Emotion 
Recent works have reinstated the importance for scholars to divulge 
individual differences which co-vary the process of ideological placement (Jost, 
2006). Illuminating the antecedents of these liberal vs. conservative ideologies has 
become an important focus in political psychology, especially with the increasingly 
polarized nature in which western world politics operate (McCarty, Poole, & 
Rosenthal, 2008). The left-right, or liberalism-conservatism distinction is argued to 
be a pattern of political attitudes in which people tend to gravitate towards, for 
reasons which surpass individual party policy domains (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & 
Sulloway, 2003). Alford, Funk and Hibbing (2005) describe the left side as a 
‘contextualist’ orientation, in that these parties have an opposition to authority and 
hierarchy, low punitiveness, high empathy, an optimistic view and a higher tolerance 
of out-groups. This is compared to the ‘absolutist’ perspective, which is in support of 
societal inequality, maintains rigid morals and high punitiveness, and emphasises in-
group unison. It is thought that the two enduring dimensions of the liberal-
conservatism debate are; opinions around inequality, and attitudes to social change - 
in contrast to tradition (Jost et al., 2003).  
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Differences in the development of our political views have been shown to be 
associated with emotion (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014; Inbar, Pizarro, Iyre, & Haidt, 
2012). Emotions are automatic, and are thought to engage the ‘fast’ processing 
system (Fellous, Armony & LeDoux, 2002). Kahneman (2011) explains that the fast 
system is characterised by the use of heuristics (i.e. mental shortcuts) to inform 
judgements. Therefore, decisions guided by emotion are likely to be faster than those 
made without emotions. The slow processing system requires a considerable amount 
more mental effort, and thoroughly examines evidence before drawing conclusions 
(Kahneman, 2011). Stoker, Hay and Barr (2015) state that individuals primarily rely 
on fast thinking regularly in life, and it habitually guides the daily decision making 
process. This is especially true when individuals form political-based opinions 
(Stoker, Hay, & Barr, 2015). 
Research by Ekman (1982) explains that there are six basic/primary 
emotions; fear, anger, sadness, enjoyment, surprise and disgust. Each of the basic 
emotions are universal and are paired with systematic patterns of facial muscle 
movements (i.e. expressions). Ekman also articulates that each of the basic emotions 
are combined in order to create more complex emotions.  The primary focus of the 
current thesis is the emotion of disgust. Disgust is an emotion particularly relevant to 
research in political psychology. Many researchers have shown the ability to predict 
political views based on disgust, in that high levels of disgust predict conservative 
attitudes (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Inbar et al., 2012; Olson, 
Cadge, & Harrison, 2006). 
Though a relationship between disgust and political orientation has been 
established by researchers, not all who have endeavoured to replicate these findings 
have been successful (i.e. Brenner & Inbar, 2014). The discrepancy in these findings 
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may possibly indicate the existence of a more complex relationship between the two 
concepts. Researchers have also shown the ability to predict political ideology from 
individual levels of empathy (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). 
Remarkably, existing research combining the ability of disgust and empathy to 
concurrently predict political ideologies was not found.  
Disgust 
Disgust has been described as the repulsion response to revolting stimuli, 
commonly initiated by offensive tastes, scents or sights (Darwin, Ekman, & Prodger, 
1998). Disgusting stimuli are equally thought of as distasteful and dangerous (Rozin, 
Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). Exclamations of disgust are often paired with facial 
expressions and behaviours which function in order to prevent individuals coming 
into contact with potentially dangerous stimuli (Darwin et al., 1998).  Hence, disgust 
is thought to facilitate a behavioural defence mechanism against contamination and 
disease (Plutchik, 1980), as it enables recognition of the infection potential within 
certain stimuli (Curtis & Biran, 2001). Consequently, Schaller (2006) described 
disgust as a function of the ‘behavioural immune system’. The behavioural immune 
system helps to detect infectious pathogens, triggering the cognitive, behavioural and 
emotional responses necessary to avoid infection.  Triggering the emotion of disgust 
is associated with neural activation in the thalamus and medial prefrontal cortex 
(Lane, Reiman, Ahern, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1997), other researchers provide 
evidence for disgust to activate the amygdala, thalamus, midbrain and visual cortex 
(Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002).  
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Theoretical Model of Disgust 
Theorists have developed a conceptual model in order to clarify the 
underpinnings of disgust. Disgust, according to this conceptualisation, has been 
though to consist of three separate constructs (Olatunji et al., 2007). The first 
construct, core disgust, is the feeling of offensiveness that is elicited in response to 
unusual or toxic substances, so as to protect the person against contamination (Rozin 
et al., 2008). Rozin and Fallon (1987) explain that in order to elicit core disgust, the 
person must have an impending likelihood of oral contact, a sense of offensiveness, 
and stimuli must hold a high level of perceived contamination potency.   
Though disgust may have initiated as part of an evolutionary food rejection 
system, the emotion has evolved to elicit as a response to a wider array of 
circumstances (Rozin et al., 2008). The second construct, animal-reminder, is the 
feeling evoked by reminding humans of their existence as mere animals. For 
instance, humans are fragile - they can be injured (expose bone and tissue, shed 
blood) and will one day become deceased. Therefore, people are disgusted by stimuli 
which reminds them of their fragility. Similarly, the animal-reminder element 
protects the consciousness from being made aware of the certainty of death (Rozin et 
al., 2008). Furthermore, exposure to contaminated fluids resulting from body 
envelope violations (i.e. blood) act as tokens of human vulnerability, and thus also 
elicit the disgust response (Rozin et al., 2008).  Persons are also disgusted by animal-
like behaviour. For example, society places norms around the ‘proper’ way to eat, 
excrete and have intercourse - in order to avoid feeling animal-like. Thus, evidence 
shows that when faced with events serving as reminders of their animal origins - 
humans feel disgusted (Rozin et al., 2008).  
7 
 
 
 
 The final construct is contamination-based disgust. This construct is the 
perceived threat of possible infection/disease and is therefore purely cognition based. 
That is, for an individual to classify certain stimuli as disgusting depends on their 
understanding of that stimuli, and its context and history. Negative contagion is a 
belief held mostly by western world adults and is produced by disgust elicitors 
(Rozin, Haidt & McCauley, 1999). When at least two stimuli come into contact (one 
or more of which are considered infectious), there is a belief the two entities will 
permanently share pathogens (Rozin et al., 1999). No matter how brief the time 
period of contact is, humans are likely to permanently render the originally ‘clean’ 
stimuli as contaminated (Rozin et al., 1999). For example, stirring a bowl of soup 
with a used, but since disinfected fly-swatter will render the soup unsafe for 
consumption. However, the soup would have been consumed without the knowledge 
of the fly-swatter’s use during preparation (Olatunji et al., 2007).   
Disgust: Not just contamination related 
As aforementioned, the behavioural immune system is a useful mechanism in 
protecting against infection. However, the system primarily responds to a set of 
general, superficial cues which result in avoidance of non-threatening stimuli, 
including people. Evidence has shown these cues to include race (Faulkner, Schaller, 
Park, & Duncan, 2004), old age (Duncan & Schaller, 2009), physical disability 
(Park, Faulkner & Schaller, 2009), as well as obesity (Park, Schaller, & Crandall, 
2007). Hence, the behavioural immune system has been shown to lead to the 
adoption of xenophobic attitudes and other appearance-based prejudices (Schaller & 
Park, 2011). Rozin and colleagues (2008) propose that disgust has a protective 
mechanism for the social self. That is, disgust helps to protect the self from complex 
stimuli that may be culturally or morally aberrant (i.e. homosexuality, incest, racism, 
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obesity), making disgust a concept relative to culture and time. Rozin and colleagues 
explain that humans also feel disgusted in response to situations which defy morality. 
For example, after observing a video about American neo-Nazis, participants in an 
experiment conducted by Sherman, Haidt and Coan (2007) reported extremely high 
disgust. Therefore, it is not just food and contamination fears which elicit disgust, but 
so too do themes of racism, betrayal and hypocrisy. Disgust has evolved to refer to a 
function which serves to protect the self from physical, social, as well as 
psychological harm (Rozin et al., 2008).  
Disgust Sensitivity  
As with most emotions, humans experience disgust in a variety of diverse 
ways, and react to disgusting stimuli with varied intensities (from mild to severe; 
Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000). Each person’s reaction to disgusting stimuli 
varies depending on their propensity to deem stimuli as threatening during their 
appraisal process. Some individuals are more likely to conclude stimuli as 
threatening during this appraisal than others (Rozin et al., 2000). That is, whether 
stimuli are considered unpleasant or disgusting is a result of their level of disgust 
sensitivity (Van Overveld, de Jong, Peters, Cavanagh, & Davey, 2006). Hence, 
individuals who show more intense, adverse reactions to stimuli are termed to have a 
‘high disgust sensitivity’. This is in comparison to those with lower levels of disgust 
sensitivity, who will display less extreme reactions.  
Having a high level of disgust sensitivity has been shown to be a predictor of 
a variety of individual differences. For example, researchers have found that having 
high levels of disgust sensitivity is a risk factor for a variety of anxiety conditions 
(Olatunji & Sawchuck, 2005). Similarly, high levels of disgust sensitivity also 
predict conservative voting patterns (Terrizzi Jr et al., 2010). As having high disgust 
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sensitivity (and therefore a stronger behavioural immune system) predicts both 
anxiety and conservatism, it is likely that individuals will inherently be more vigilant 
of the happenings within their environment. In turn, this will lead to an increase in 
processing negative, anxiety-provoking information (Schaller & Park, 2011), 
resulting in the development of conservative attitudes, due to fears of contamination 
(Faulkner et al., 2004).  
Previous research has also assessed whether sensitivities to disgust differ 
depending on demographic variables. Evidence has been contradictory, with Haidt, 
McCauley and Rozin (1994) finding that disgust differed between sexes (women 
more sensitive than men), religion (Jews more highly sensitive than Protestants) and 
race (Asian and black participants being more sensitive than white participants). 
Similarly, Brenner and Inbar (2014) also found that disgust sensitivity levels differed 
by gender (women significantly more sensitive), education (people with a bachelor 
degree had significantly higher levels of disgust sensitivity than those with 
vocational training), as well as finding age differences (older participants less 
sensitive) and political ideology (those with conservative views were more sensitive). 
However, Inbar, Pizarro and Bloom (2009) found no differences in disgust sensitivity 
levels depending on religious identification, age or income. Terrizzi Jr and 
colleagues (2010) also found no differences in disgust sensitivity between gender, 
wage or healthcare.  
The Relationship between Disgust Sensitivity and Political Ideology 
 
Disgust is also salient within judgements of morality (Inbar et al., 2009). 
Differing ideals, amid behaviours and beliefs which are classified as morally just, are 
often at the root of political disagreements between liberal and conservative parties 
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(Haidt & Graham, 2007). In research conducted by Haidt and Graham (2007), it was 
found that participants with conservative political beliefs were more likely to hold 
the preservation of purity at the forefront of concepts guiding their moral philosophy, 
as compared to liberal voters. Consequently, when asked to decide whether a 
person’s actions were to be classed as ‘right or wrong’, self-described conservatives 
were more inclined than liberals to guide their moral judgements based on whether 
someone ‘did something disgusting’. Thus, disgust is an emotion relevant to morals, 
and in turn, politically conservative standpoints.  
Research has also shown that having a high disgust sensitivity is correlated 
with prejudice attitudes towards people in the ‘outgroup’, (i.e. immigrants; Faulkner 
et al., 2004) and sexual minorities (Terrizzi Jr et al., 2010). High levels of disgust 
sensitivity also correlate with high levels of social and political conservatism, right 
wing authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism (Inbar et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 
2012; Terrizzi Jr et al., 2010). In a study conducted by Inbar and colleagues (2009), it 
was found that the opposition of gay marriage and abortion were significantly 
correlated with high levels of disgust sensitivity. This evidence is in line with other 
findings which indicate that people with conservative attitudes are likely to oppose 
same-sex unions (Olson et al., 2006). Inbar and colleagues (2009) also found that 
self-reported conservatism predicted disgust sensitivity. 
Researchers have also verified that by inducing the emotion of disgust, 
participants have harsher, more negative responses to issues around gay adoption and 
watching internet pornography (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014). Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and 
Jordan (2008) also found that by manipulating participants disgust levels (using a 
clean-versus-dirty environment), participants in the dirtier environment made harsher 
moral judgements, in comparison to those in a clean environment. Similarly, Schnall 
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and colleagues found that the induction of disgust (by watching a disgusting film, or 
being in a disgusting environment) led to the implementation of more severe moral 
judgements. The above evidence indicates that having higher levels of disgust leads 
to the adoption of conservative moral and political appraisals.  
Studies show that the contamination domain of disgust has the strongest 
relationship with conservative political views, as compared to the core and animal-
reminder domains (Inbar et al., 2012). Inbar and colleagues (2009) explain that 
disgust is an evolutionary and primary emotion which emerges before humans 
develop political beliefs. Disgust reactions to tastes are evident in newborns 
(Rosenstein & Oster, 1988), while reactions to disgusting odorants typically emerge 
around 5 years of age (Petò, 1936; Stein, Ottenberg, & Roulet, 1958). Hence, it is 
thought that emotional dispositions (such as that of disgust) are unlikely to be altered 
by the later development of political attitudes. Consequently, it is likely that the 
relationship may be linear, with disgust sensitivity predicting political ideologies 
(Inbar et al., 2009). That is, when a person’s disgust sensitivity is low, so too are 
their conservative attitudes. Likewise, when disgust sensitivity is high, conservative 
attitudes are dominant. In studies conducted by Terrizzi Jr and colleagues (2010), a 
stronger correlation was found between disgust and conservative ideologies when 
participant disgust levels were manipulated (through writing a passage of text 
describing the texture, taste, smell and their stomach’s reaction to eating maggots), as 
compared to when their inherent disgust sensitivity levels were used as a predictor.  
Conflicting Evidence on the Relationship between Disgust and Political Beliefs 
Though a relationship between the concepts of disgust and political 
orientation has been validated by many researchers, the strength of this relationship 
is not consistently strong. For instance, Inbar and colleagues (2012) found a small 
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effect size for the relationship between conservatism and disgust sensitivity, while 
Brenner and Inbar (2014) were unable to find a significant effect. Similarly, other 
studies have revealed that disgust predicts liberal economic attitudes (Petrescu & 
Parkinson, 2014). Inbar and colleagues (2009) specify that level of disgust sensitivity 
is just one of many individual differences known to be associated with political 
orientation. This may explain why despite great empirical evidence and theoretical 
background suggesting a strong relationship between disgust and political attitudes, 
the data suggests otherwise.  Because of this, the current study suggests that it is 
possible there may be another confounding variable impacting on this relationship, 
and without accounting for its contribution, the data will remain insufficient in its 
ability to explain the relationship. It is hypothesised that this confounding variable 
may be the possession of high levels of empathy.   
Empathy  
Empathy is another emotion identified as a predictor of political attitudes 
(Crawford, 2014; Mencl & May, 2009).  Definitions of empathy are largely diverse 
and include descriptions of an entity dependent upon knowledge, communication, 
capacity, mental processes, ego expression, previous experience and perceptions 
(Reed, 1984). Generally, empathy can be thought of as the bodily and psychological 
experience of feeling and understanding the momentary emotional state of another 
person (Salazar-Lopez et al., 2015). Empathy allows individuals to understand how 
and why others think and feel the way they do. It also provides us with the capacity 
to judge how our own behaviours may be perceived by others (Crawford, 2014). In 
comparison to more general definitions of emotion, empathy is contradictory in that 
it challenges the idea that emotions exist in order to fulfil personal goals/needs 
(Wondra & Ellsworth, 2015).  
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Crawford (2014) explains that our empathy levels lead to a behaviour 
disposition – that is, more empathetic individuals participate in more pro-social 
behaviours and are less likely to display social prejudices. Joliffe and Farrington 
(2006) explain that a lack of empathy predicts antisocial and aggressive behaviours, 
resulting from the inability of the individual to comprehend the negative reactions of 
their target. People high in empathy are able to assess these unfavourable 
consequences, in turn making them less inclined to repeat negative behaviours in the 
future (Feshbach, 1975). Similarly, by inducing empathy in their participants, 
Batson, Chang, Orr, and Rowland (2002) found that high levels of induced empathy 
led to more favourable attitudes to drug addicts and a willingness to provide higher 
levels of funding to help them recover. High levels of empathy in adolescence has 
also shown to reduce levels of bullying (Ang & Goh., 2010; Joliffe & Farrington, 
2006). Typically, evidence shows that women have higher levels of empathy than 
men (Carrè et al., 2013; Joliffe & Farrington, 2006). However other researchers have 
found there to be no sex differences (Cox et al., 2012). Difficulties with moral 
reasoning have been linked to individuals possessing a defective mirror neuron 
system, therefore impairing empathetic responses (Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson 
& Singer, 2010). The brain uses distinct neurons to help humans feel what others 
may be experiencing. These neurons, termed mirror neurons, fire in the brain both 
when an individual engages in behaviour, as well as when the individual observes 
another’s behaviour (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeaut, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003).  
A greater understanding of the underpinnings of empathy may help to explain 
how/why/when interpersonal relationships alter from positive to negative, or vice 
versa (Crawford, 2014). Persistent conflict/tensions between groups is largely 
characterised by low levels of empathy (Crawford, 2014). Henceforth, empathy has 
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been identified as a crucial element in the attainment of human rights, democracy 
and peace (Crawford, 2014). Evidence also shows that having high empathy levels 
leads to the adoption of more liberal views (Pratto, et al., 1994). Furthermore, 
elements of empathy impede on the desire for dominance of particular social groups 
over others (Pratto et al., 1994). Similarly, lower levels of empathy lead to amplified 
negative views towards stigmatized groups (i.e. drug addicts), as compared with high 
levels which result in more positive attitudes (Batson et al., 2002). By increasing 
empathy levels, attitudes can become more positive (Batson et al., 2002). The 
aforementioned shows evidence for empathy regulating political attitudes. Tagney 
and Dearing (2002) explain that this may be due to the fact that individuals high in 
empathy are likely to be able to reason and evaluate the adverse effects of their 
possible actions and decisions.  
Affective and Cognitive Empathy 
Empathy can be broken down into two components; cognitive and affective 
empathy (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006). The two dimensions are seen as interrelated, 
yet distinct (Cox et al., 2012). The cognitive component involves identifying and 
understanding another’s emotional state (Hogan, 1969). Strayer (1987) articulates 
that the cognitive component is the process in which the feeling of empathy is 
formed. That is, cognitive empathy is a top-down process - the understanding of 
others’ emotions is based on the ability to distinguish ourselves from others 
(Jankowiak-Siuda, Rymarczyk, & Grabowska, 2011), and understand another’s 
feelings, intentions, beliefs or desires (Hein & Singer, 2008). Hence, cognitive 
empathy is also termed theory of mind, perspective taking or empathic accuracy 
(Olderbak, Sassenrath, Keller & Wilhelm, 2014). 
15 
 
 
 
Cognitive empathy is shown to be related to higher levels of intergroup 
contact (Falk & Johnson, 1977), and reduced negative stereotyping (Todd, 
Bodenhausen, Richeson & Galinsky, 2011). Mencl and May (2009) also found that 
cognitive empathy significantly predicted individual intention to act morally, as well 
as principle based evaluations (i.e. beliefs held about the welfare of others). 
Similarly, Kalliopuska (1983), along with Leith and Baumeister (1998) both found 
the cognitive element of empathy to be related to moral judgment. A disruption in 
cognitive empathy is often true for those diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (Cox et al., 2012).  
The affective component of empathy, otherwise referred to as emotional 
contagion or emotional empathy, allows us to feel the emotions another person is 
feeling (Batson, 2009). Therefore, it allows us to perceive the wellbeing and 
emotional state of others, and form appropriate emotional responses to these states 
(de Wied et al., 2007). Strayer (1987) suggests that affective empathy is felt by the 
individual as a result of the cognitive evaluation of another’s state. Jankowiak-Siuda 
and colleagues (2011) explain affective empathy is a bottom-up process. That is, the 
neural representation systems internally reflect another’s emotional state, enabling an 
individual to achieve a similar state of feeling.  
Affective empathy has been shown to lead to more successful interpersonal 
outcomes within organisational negotiation processes, leading to favourable 
conclusions drawn for all involved (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui & Raja, 1997). 
Similarly, Moore (1990), and Pizarro and Salovey (2002) found the affective 
component of empathy to be closely related to a motivation to act morally. 
Disruptions in affective empathy indicate psychopathology (Cox et al., 2012). The 
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affective component of empathy relies both on biology and social context (Iacoboni, 
2009) to enable emotional mimicry (Nummenmaa et al., 2008).  
By inducing both cognitive and affective empathy separately in their 
participants, Nummenmaa and colleagues (2008) found a greater increase in neural 
activity and blood flow (using fMRI technology) by eliciting affective empathy in 
comparison to cognitive. The researchers separately induced cognitive and affective 
empathy by asking participants to view a series of scenes. Affective empathy was 
evoked through the use of emotional interpersonal scenes (i.e. attacker and a victim), 
while cognitive empathy was induced via viewing non-emotional interpersonal 
scenes. At no time during the experiment were brains in the cognitive empathy state 
more activated than when in the affective state. Activity associated with affective 
empathy was located primarily in brain regions involved in emotional processing 
(thalamus), perception of faces and bodies (fusiform gyrus), and 
understanding/simulating others actions (inferior parietal lobule). Affective empathy 
also resulted in a much higher rate of mirroring (activation of the premotor cortex) 
than cognitive empathy. During cognitive empathy, activity is evident in brain 
regions including the fusiform gyrus, parahippocampal gyrus (involved in perception 
and memory systems; Baumann & Mattingly, 2016) and the cuneus (responsible for 
the integration of somatosensory information with other sensory stimuli, as well as 
attention, learning and memory; Price, 2000). The researchers claim that this is 
evidence of distinct networks for cognitive and affective empathy.  
Cox and Colleagues (2012) assessed the difference in brain structures 
between cognitive-dominant and affective-dominant participants (as measured by the 
difference between cognitive and affective empathy scores on the interpersonal 
reactivity index – a measure of empathy; Davis, 1983). Affective empathy was 
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associated with stronger neural connectivity among areas of the brain involved in 
social-emotional processing (i.e. insula, amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, perigenual 
anterior cingulate). This is compared to people who were dominant in cognitive 
empathy, who displayed stronger neural connections in areas associated in internal 
understanding of the body, self-monitoring and social-cognitive processing (i.e. the 
brainstem, superior temporal sulcus, ventral anterior insula).  
Disgust and Empathy 
Wicker and colleagues (2003), as well as Jabbi, Swart and Keysers (2006) 
conducted separate studies which both found that the anterior insula and the adjacent 
frontal operculum (jointly referred to as the IFO; Phillips et al., 1997) were activated 
during exposure to disgusting tastants (a chemical which stimulates the sense of 
taste), as well as when watching other people who are experiencing disgust. Their 
study found that when participants were viewing other disgusted facial expressions, 
they could predict the activation of participant IFO via their empathy scores. The 
study concluded that the IFO contributes to empathy by its ability to map feelings of 
another into the individual’s internal state, findings which are especially evident for 
the emotion of disgust. This makes it likely that the IFO is important for the 
activation of emotion, as well as having the ability to map the emotions of others, 
and leads observers to also experience those states (Jabbi, Swart & Keysers, 2006).  
This is possible evidence of disgust taking temporal precedence over empathy.  
Empathy and Disgust influencing Politics 
Currently a study which examines the relation between disgust and political 
ideologies, as well as the influence of empathy, cannot be identified. However, a 
study conducted by Ben-Nun Bloom (2014) depicts research which is comparable. In 
the study, researchers presented their participants with a story which primes feelings 
18 
 
 
 
of disgust (classified as a moral emotion). They then increased participant moral 
conviction by encouraging the consideration of harm (i.e. induce empathy) done so 
by telling them a story about moral issues. Participants who were primed with 
disgust were more likely to propose harsher moral judgement to offenders than 
participants in a neutrally primed condition. This suggests that disgust and empathy 
interact to alter pre-existing political attitudes. By taking into account the influence 
that empathy may have on the relationship between disgust and political attitudes, we 
may be able to explain why previous researchers obtained fluctuating, contradictory 
results. By combining the predicative ability of disgust and empathy, it may be 
possible to devise a more robust predictor of political attitudes.  
Aims and Hypothesis  
The current research is interested in the possibility of creating a more reliable 
predictor of political attitudes by combining the predictive ability of disgust and 
empathy. It is thought that by including empathy as a variable which facilitates the 
relationship between disgust and political attitudes, that we may be better able to 
predict ideologies, and as a result, comprehend the discrepancies found previously in 
this area of research. That is, we may be able to reveal a multifaceted relation, and 
demonstrate that disgust is not an element which solely influences/forecasts political 
viewpoints as previous researchers have thought. Therefore, the current research aim 
is to determine whether having high levels of empathy mediates the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and political ideology. That is, having high levels of 
disgust sensitivity may not predict conservative ideologies, if the individual is also 
high in empathy. In this case, regardless of high disgust sensitivity, individuals high 
in empathy may hold more liberal (rather than conservative) beliefs.  
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It is also the aim to establish whether there is an enhanced ability to explain 
political ideology through disgust when assessing affective and cognitive empathy 
separately, and whether there are any differences between the predictive ability 
between the two types. Though there are differences between affective and cognitive 
empathy (i.e. brain structures, function, previous research), researchers have 
confirmed that both are related to political ideologies.  Therefore, it is likely that by 
evaluating affective and cognitive empathy independently, both will result in a 
significant mediation. Two hypotheses were developed in order to assess the 
unexplored relationships which may contribute to our understanding of the individual 
development of political ideologies:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): cognitive empathy will mediate the relationship between 
disgust sensitivity and political ideology, that is:  
a) Individuals high in disgust sensitivity and low in cognitive empathy are 
more likely to have conservative political ideologies, as compared to; 
b) Individuals high in disgust sensitivity as well as possessing high levels of 
cognitive empathy who are more likely to have liberal political ideologies 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): affective empathy will also mediate the relationship between 
disgust sensitivity and political ideology, that is:  
a) Individuals high in disgust sensitivity and low in affective empathy are more 
likely to have conservative political ideologies, as compared to; 
b) Individuals high in disgust sensitivity as well as possessing high levels of 
affective empathy who are more likely to have liberal political ideologies 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were selected on the basis that they were over the age of 18 
years, and were students enrolled in the unit KHA106, Brain, Mind and Emotion at 
the University of Tasmania, across both Launceston and Hobart campuses. Students 
were asked to participate in the current research as part of their coursework module 
on the topic of motivation and emotions. Students were all given the opportunity to 
include their data in the current study. A total of 202 students logged onto the survey 
website. Two participants were excluded as they responded in an unlikely fashion 
(i.e. participant answered ‘1’ to every question on the Likert scales, despite item 
reversal). A further two participants’ data was excluded as they failed to complete 
the DS-R. After excluding the data from participants who did not want to be included 
(n = 28), a total of 170 participants’ data was retained. Table 1 depicts the 
demographic data for all participants.  
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Table 1  
Demographic Data for Participants 
Characteristic  N = 170 (100%) 
Sex   
        Female  139 (82%) 
        Male 30 (17%) 
        Rather Not Say 1 (1%) 
Age  
         Mean (SD)  23.60 (8.58)  
Ethnicity   
        Caucasian  150 (88%) 
        Other 20 (12%)  
Highest Level of Completed Education  
        High School/TAFE/College 157 (92%)  
        Bachelor  11 (7%)  
        Masters/PhD  2 (1%)  
Native Language  
        English 155 (91%) 
        Other 15 (9%) 
Religious   
        No  125 (74%)  
        Yes 45 (26%)  
               Christian (including Catholic and Anglican) 40 (89%) 
               Other 5 (11%) 
Religiosity Strength (0-10)   
         Mean (SD)  2.27 (3.07)  
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Materials 
The Disgust Scale – Revised (DS-R; Olatunji et al., 2007): The Disgust Scale 
– Revised was used in order to measure participant levels of disgust sensitivity. The 
DS-R is a two-part measure consisting of 25 items (13 in the first section, 12 in the 
second). Items assess disgust sensitivity in line with a three-factor structure: core 
disgust (12 items), animal-reminder disgust (8 items) and contamination-based 
disgust (5 items). Items in part one of the scale require a true/false response (i.e. ‘it 
would bother me tremendously to touch a dead body’). In part two, participants are 
required to rate how disgusting they believe each experience would be as either; 
‘not’, ‘slightly’ or ‘very’ disgusting (i.e. ‘you see a man with his intestines exposed 
after an accident’). A score of 25 reflects the highest measurable score on the DS-R 
and reveals an extremely high disgust sensitivity, while a score of 0 reflects no 
disgust sensitivity (Olatunji et al., 2007).  This version of the scale has adequate 
Cronbach’s α estimate of .84, and a split-half coefficient of .76 (Olantunji et al., 
2007).  
Basic Empathy Scale in Adults (BES-A): To measure participant empathy 
levels, the Basic Empathy Scale in Adults (Carrè et al., 2013) was administered. The 
scale consists of 20 items which aligns to a two-factor model of empathy (cognitive 
and affective empathy). The affective empathy subscale contains 11 items (i.e., ‘I 
don’t become sad when I see other people crying’). The cognitive subscale contains 
9 items (i.e., ‘I can understand how people are feeling even before they tell me’). 
Items are responded to on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree, 
to 5 = strongly agree. Lower scores represent a deficit in empathy and higher scores 
represent a highly developed level of empathy. The two subscales’ scores range from 
11 - 55 for affective empathy, and 9 - 45 for the cognitive empathy subscale. The 
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test-retest reliability coefficients are adequate for both the affective and cognitive 
subscales, with significant relations (Carrè et al., 2013).  
Australian Political Ideology Scale (APIS): Despite a thorough literature 
review, a current measure of Australian political ideology was not found. Therefore, 
Brenner and Inbar’s (2014) measure of political attitudes in the Netherlands was 
modified for use in an Australian population. Items were developed based upon the 
issues currently considered relevant in the Australian political climate. These were 
identified through recent/relevant news articles, Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation’s (ABC) ‘Compass’ webpage and Vote Compass tool.  This tool 
assesses political views using a large survey and aligns them to the ideals of the local 
political parties’ members (ABC, 2016). The final scale, referred to as the Australian 
Political Ideology Scale (APIS; Appendix A), consisted of 39 items (15 of which are 
reversed), which were measured on a 5-point Likert Scale ranging from 1 (totally 
disagree), to 5 (totally agree), with lower scores indicative of a more liberal ideology. 
The APIS comprised of six subscales:  
‘Immigration and Islam’ contained 11 items measuring attitudes towards 
immigration and Islam (i.e. “immigrants take the local’s jobs”). ‘Sex and sexual 
preference’ contained eight items which measured attitudes around sex and sexual 
orientations (i.e. “same-sex marriage should be legalised”). ‘Indigenous Australia’ 
contained five items which measured attitudes towards issues concerning Indigenous 
peoples (i.e. “the date of Australia Day should be changed out of respect for 
Indigenous peoples”). ‘Sexism’ contained five items which evaluated attitudes 
towards sexism (i.e. “men are better in their work than women”). ‘Finance and 
Business’ consisted of five items which gaged attitudes around finance and business 
issues in Australia (i.e. “the minimum wage should be raised”). ‘Foreign 
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Intervention’ consisted of five items which assessed attitudes towards Australia’s 
involvement in foreign intervention (i.e. “Australia should take their troops out of 
Syria”). Homogeneity of reliability analysis found the scale had a Cronbach’s α of 
.91 and a Spearman Brown split half unequal length reliability coefficient of .93 
(Appendix B) indicating good reliability (Gregory, 2011).  
Procedure 
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Tasmania Human 
Ethics Committee (see Appendix C). Participants were asked to voluntarily log onto 
the online survey as part of an undergraduate unit’s self-directed practical activity. 
Participants read an information sheet (Appendix D) and completed a consent form 
(Appendix E), where they could choose whether they wished to include their data in 
the final analysis. Following this, demographic information was collected (Appendix 
E), including age, sex, ethnicity and education level. As research has shown a 
correlation between religiosity and conservatism (i.e. Kelly & Morgan, 2005), we 
collected data on religion type and strength of religion belief. Participants then 
completed the APIS, followed by the BES-A and lastly the DS-R. This order was 
chosen so as to avoid any elicitation of disgust feelings which may have influenced 
responses.   
Results 
Data Screening 
The data set was analysed for outliers by reviewing box-plots. Two outlying 
data points (one extremely low score on the BES-A, one high score from the DS-R) 
were assigned the score of one unit above or below the next most extreme score in 
the distribution, a procedure outlined by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). All 
assumptions of the analysis were considered (i.e. normality, multicollinearity, 
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homoscedasticity, independence, linearity) and it was determined that the data set 
met the necessary requirements. For the following analyses alpha levels were 
maintained at a level of α = 0.05 using two-tailed significance. Cohen’s d effect sizes 
will be interpreted as 0.2 (small), 0.5 (medium), and 0.8 (large) as outlined by Cohen 
(1988).  
In relation to demographic differences of the scale scores (for values and 
interpretation see Appendix F, for output see G), the current sample found a 
significant difference between sexes on the DS-R. Males had moderately greater 
disgust sensitivity than females, a result inconsistent with previous findings (i.e. 
Brenner & Inbar, 2014; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). All other demographics 
acted as expected on the DS-R.  For the BES-A, all demographic variable differences 
were as expected. A correlation analysis between the affective and cognitive 
subscales of the BES-A was significant (Appendix H). This relationship is of 
moderate strength, inferring that the subscales should not be impacted on by possible 
multicollinearity effects. 
For the APIS, there was a significant difference between ethnicities, with 
Caucasians having more liberal scores on the APIS compared to other ethnicities. 
This represented a small to moderate effect. These findings were unexpected, as it is 
common for ethnic minorities to favour parties which favour change and accept 
differences. There was also a significant correlation between measurements of 
participant religiosity and APIS scores, meaning that as participant level of 
religiosity increased, so too did their level of conservatism. Due to this result, 
religiosity strength included as a covariate in the mediation model to control for the 
relationship (Appendix I).  Table 2 shows the mean scores, standard deviations, 
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range, and 95% confidence intervals around the mean for measures employed (see 
Appendix I for the SPSS output). 
 
Table 2  
Participants’ Scores on each Scale Assessed According to the Mean, Standard 
Deviation (SD), Range, and the 95% Confidence Intervals around the Mean 
Scale Mean SD Range 95%CI for 
Mean 
DS-R 12.25 2.21 7-20 11.92 - 12.58 
BES - Affective 40.68 6.87 18-55 39.64 - 41.72 
BES - Cognitive 35.11 4.45 21-45 34.43 - 35.78 
APIS 86.67 17.52 49-130 84.02 - 89.32 
 
 
Data Analysis  
Using SPSS version 23.0 with the PROCESS add-on (Hayes, 2013), two 
mediation analyses were performed. Mediation is a method used to investigate the 
underlying mechanisms in specific relationships. In this case, the mechanism 
underlying the relationship between disgust (predictor variable) and political 
ideology (outcome variable), is predicted to be empathy (mediator variable). Using 
bootstrapping methods of 5000 samples, and bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals 
(BCa 95% CI), indirect effects were estimated. Confidence intervals of 95% were 
bias-corrected as bootstrapped distributions are not equal across estimates of the 
indirect effect. A significant mediation is indicated by a 95% confidence interval 
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which does not contain zero (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Hayes (2013) explains that 
when a mediation model includes a covariate, regular effect size outputs (i.e. κ2; 
Preacher and Kelley, 2011) are suppressed as they cannot take into account the 
effects of the covariate. In this case, Hayes recommends using the completely 
standardised indirect effect, which gauges the indirect effect relative to variation in 
the outcome and predictor variable, while controlling for the covariate, and is 
interpreted based on standard deviation change in the outcome variable.  
Mediation Analyses 
Before including mediator variables in the model, the relation between 
disgust and political orientation was significant, b = -1.18, p = .049, 95%CI [-2.34, -
.01]. From a simple mediation analysis conducted using ordinary least squares 
regression analysis, disgust sensitivity levels did not indirectly predict political 
ideology through cognitive empathy levels. As can be seen from Figure 1 and Table 
3, a non-significant result showed participant disgust sensitivity did not contribute to 
cognitive empathy. Participants who possessed higher levels of cognitive empathy, 
had more liberal ideologies (b = -0.72). The confidence interval for the indirect effect 
(ab) contained zero [ -.31, .19], meaning that cognitive empathy did not act as a 
mechanism to help explain the relationship between disgust and ideologies. With the 
inclusion of cognitive empathy in the model, disgust sensitivity levels did not 
influence political ideology, although this approached significance (c’= -1.15, p = 
.050). The impact of the covariate, strength of religious belief, was also significant in 
the model b = 1.33, p =.002, 95%CI [0.50, 2.16] (Appendix K). 
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Note. Values marked with asterisks are indicative of a significant relationship as the 95% confidence intervals do not cross zero. 
Figure 1. Simple mediation model of cognitive empathy as a mediator on the 
relationship of disgust sensitivity and Australian political ideology.  
Table 3 
Model Coefficients for the Mediation Including Affective Empathy 
                                   M (Cognitive Empathy) 
        
           Y (Political Ideology) 
   Coeff. SE p  Coeff SE p 
X(Disgust)  a 0.04 0.16 .814 c’ -.1.14 0.58 .050 
M(Cognitive)   - - - b -0.718 0.29 .015 
Constant  i1 34.36 1.95  i2 122.90 12.39 <.001 
             R2 = 0.01                                R2 = 0.10 
  F(2,167) = 0.69, p =.502                 F(3,166) = 6.32, p < .001 
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A second mediation analysis was conducted using ordinary least squares 
regression analysis, with affective empathy included as the mediator. In this model, 
disgust sensitivity levels indirectly predicted political ideology through affective 
empathy levels. As can be seen from Figure 2 and Table 4, participant with high 
disgust sensitivity levels also possessed lower levels of affective empathy (a = -
0.52). Participants who possessed higher levels of affective empathy, had more 
liberal ideologies (b = -0.46). The confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab) was 
above zero [.001, .095]. There was also evidence that disgust sensitivity levels 
influenced political ideology independent of its effect on empathy (c’= -1.17, p = 
.049), thus indicating mediation. The impact of the covariate, strength of religious 
belief, was also significant in the model b = 1.33, p =.002, 95%CI [.50, 2.16] 
(Appendix L). 
 
Note. Values marked with asterisks are indicative of a significant relationship as the 95% confidence intervals do not cross zero. 
Figure 2. Simple mediation model of affective empathy as a mediator on the 
relationship effect of disgust sensitivity on Australian political ideology.  
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Table 4 
Model Coefficients for the Mediation Including Affective Empathy 
                                  M (Affective 
Empathy) 
                           Y (Political Ideology) 
  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p 
X(Disgust) a -0.52 0.24 .028 c’ -.1.41 0.59 .018 
M (Affective)  - - - b -0.456 0.19 .018 
Constant i1 46.57 2.96  i2 119.48 11.55 <.001 
                                    R2 = 0.04                                   R2 = 0.10 
                       F(2,167) = 3.30, p = .039                         F(3,166) = 6.17, p = .005 
 
 
Discussion 
The current study hypothesised that having high levels empathy would 
mediate the relation between disgust and political ideology. It was intended to 
determine whether including empathy (either affective or cognitive) in two mediating 
models would significantly enhance ability to predict ideologies from disgust scores.  
Results support the prospect of a more complex association between disgust 
sensitivity and political ideology – indicated by the significant partial mediation 
effect of affective empathy. However, results failed to reveal a mediation effect of 
cognitive empathy. These findings are further discussed below.  
Hypothesis 1  
Our first hypothesis, that cognitive empathy would mediate the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and political ideology, was not supported. This means 
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that adding cognitive empathy in the model did not help to further explain the 
association between disgust and political ideologies. This result infers that cognitive 
empathy is not a mechanism which helps to explain the association between disgust 
sensitivity and political ideology.  It is possible that this result reflects the 
independence of cognitive empathy and disgust (both theoretically and 
neurologically; Moll et al., 2002; Lane et al., 1997; Nummenmaa et al., 2008; Cox et 
al., 2012).  
The association between disgust sensitivity and cognitive empathy was non-
significant. This shows that disgust sensitivity did not seem to impact on cognitive 
empathy. That is, even if individuals have a high disgust sensitivity, these levels do 
not seem to increase/decrease cognitive empathy. Although not directly related to the 
hypothesis, it is noteworthy that the results of the model show that higher levels of 
cognitive empathy are related to the adoption of more liberal ideologies – an 
expected finding, confirming results outlined in previous literature (Falk & Johnson, 
1977; Kalliopuska, 1983; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson 
& Galinsky, 2011).  
Furthermore, although a significant relation was found between disgust and 
political orientation before adding cognitive empathy into the model, disgust 
sensitivity no longer predicted political ideology once cognitive empathy was 
included. This may indicate a stronger influence of cognitive empathy (as compared 
to DS) in that it results in a non-significant relation between disgust and political 
ideology. This suggests that once cognitive empathy is taken into consideration, 
disgust sensitivity may no longer have a meaningful impact on political ideology. 
However, further analysis is needed to confirm this finding.  This may be plausible, 
due to the findings of previous literature. That is, cognitive empathy is related to a 
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variety of ideologies and attitudes (Falk & Johnson, 1977; Kalliopuska, 1983; Leith 
& Baumeister, 1998; Todd et al, 2011; Mencl & May, 2009).  
Hypothesis 2  
The second hypothesis, that affective empathy would mediate the relationship 
between disgust and political ideology, was supported. It was found that affective 
empathy partially mediated the model. The relationship was positive, meaning that as 
empathy increases attitudes tend to be more liberal - despite sensitivity to disgust. 
The size of this mediation effect is small however, meaning that there was a small 
increase in ability to predict political ideologies from disgust scores by adding 
affective empathy into the model.  
There is a significant negative relationship between disgust sensitivity and 
affective empathy. That is, having high disgust sensitivity is associated with also 
possessing lower levels of empathy. This finding is in line with previous research 
which has shown high levels of disgust lead to more social prejudice, and social 
conservatism which reflect low levels of empathy (Inbar et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 
2012; Joliffe & Farrington, 2006; Terrizzi Jr et al., 2010).  
The relationship between affective empathy and political ideology is 
significant, and again negative. This finding indicates that having higher levels of 
affective empathy leads to liberal voting patterns and supports what was 
hypothesised based on previous research (Falk & Johnson, 1977; Kalliopuska, 1983; 
Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Todd et al, 2011).  These liberal views likely develop as a 
result of highly emotional responses to certain circumstances, information, or stories.  
Therefore, leading these individuals to vote in a way which aims for equality-based, 
liberal outcomes.  
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The effect of disgust sensitivity on political ideology while controlling for 
affective empathy was also significant. Contrary to previous literature, the 
relationship of this direct effect was negative, with higher disgust sensitivity being 
associated with more liberal ideologies. This does not reflect what was predicted 
based on previous literature, as studies show innate disgust sensitivity as a significant 
predictor of conservatism (Inbar et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 2012). Similarly, Terrizzi, 
Shook, and Ventis (2010) ran two experiments, one where they measured 
participants’ innate disgust levels and another where they induced disgust. Both 
experiments found an ability to predict conservative ideologies from disgust 
sensitives. By inducing the feeling of disgust, there was a greater effect of disgust 
predicting conservatism as compared to controls.  
Implications 
The current study illustrated that disgust significantly influences the 
development of politically conservative beliefs. However, our results also show that 
this relationship changes as a result of including empathy into the model. That is, the 
results show that affective and cognitive empathy change the way disgust and 
political ideologies relate to each other. It was found that affective empathy had a 
partial mediating effect on the relationship between disgust sensitivity and political 
ideologies, while cognitive empathy did not. High levels of affective empathy 
attenuated the effect of disgust sensitivity, leading to an increase of liberal 
ideologies. Finding this mediation effect is likely a result of the biological and 
theoretical emotion based relationship that both disgust and affective empathy share. 
That is, that the structures of the brain required to produce them are interconnected, 
and both are responsible for creating emotion based responses (Cox et al., 2012; 
Lane et al., 1997; Moll et al., 2002; Nummenmaa et al., 2008). Therefore, it is likely 
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they interact during decision making processes.  The relationship between these two 
variables may be stronger than the relation between disgust and cognitive empathy, 
which relies upon different brain networks and is much more perception-based. 
Though cognitive empathy did not show a mediation effect, it did present 
some interesting findings. The lack of mediation effect is likely a result of the 
insufficient relation between disgust and cognitive empathy, a factor necessary for a 
mediation analysis. However, the mediation model including cognitive empathy 
results in a non-significant relationship between disgust and political ideologies, and 
a significant effect of cognitive empathy on political ideology. This finding may 
indicate that cognitive empathy has such a strong impact on the relationship that it 
diminishes the ability to use disgust as a predictor of political ideologies. This may 
be likely as Mencl and May (2009) found a greater effect of cognitive empathy, than 
affective empathy, in predicting individual intention to act morally, as well as 
predicting moral-orientated judgements.  However, no concrete conclusions can be 
drawn about this without further analyses.  
Furthermore, humans use two modes of thinking; fast and slow (Kahneman, 
2011). Kahneman (2011) explains that the fast system is characterised by the use of 
heuristics (i.e. mental shortcuts) to inform judgements, while the slow system 
requires a considerable amount more mental effort, and filters through evidence to 
draw conclusions. Stoker and colleagues (2015) state that many people rely on this 
fast thinking regularly in life, and it almost always guides the daily decision making 
process. This is especially true when individuals begin to understand and form 
opinions of certain political ideas (Stoker et al., 2015). Research also shows that 
induction of emotions, particularly those with a negative salience, can lead to a 
change in political views (Way & Masters, 1996).  Emotions are elicited 
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automatically, and the strength often cannot be controlled (Fellous et al, 2002), hence 
it is believed that emotion takes the fast processing system (Damasio, 1994).  
Affective empathy is the feeling component of empathy, and so it is heavily 
grounded in emotion. It is likely that affective empathy takes the fast processing 
system as a result (Damasio, 1994). In comparison, cognitive component of empathy 
takes a complex appraisal path, considers possible outcomes and reflects upon 
different perspectives – like the slow processing system. The cognitive process is 
slower and requires more mental effort (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002). 
The aforementioned makes it likely that people often make decisions regarding 
politics in a quick, emotive manner. Hence, it is likely that individuals adopt their 
political attitudes based on heuristics such as ease of processing. If this is the case, 
people high in affective empathy may guide their decisions based on their emotional 
response to political issues, rather than systematically processing all aspects. The 
current study provides evidence of this via the mediation effect of affective empathy 
between disgust and political attitudes, providing support for the ecological validity 
of our study. 
For example, individuals may make decisions based on emotion-provoking 
stories, leading individuals who rely on emotion based heuristics to be more easily 
swayed (Hunt, Ergun, & Federico, 2008) by political advertising. This is in contrast 
to people who take time to process all available information, and are likely to use the 
required level of cognitive effort to make considered decisions (Kahneman, 2011). 
This concept is explained by dual processing models such as the heuristic-systematic 
model of information processing (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). It is thought that political 
attitudes developed based on these emotional heuristics may lack stability, may be 
easily altered, and may be heavily influenced by the media and other emotion-
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provoking information (Hunt, Ergun, & Federico, 2008). For instance, if two 
opposing emotive stories are presented in the media, it is probable that people who 
utilize the emotion processing heuristic may alter their opinions between the two 
attitudes based on the information which draws the strongest emotive response. 
Therefore, using cognitive effort as a mechanism to explain the relation between 
disgust and political ideals may not be efficacious, due to the lack of association the 
concepts shares with the emotion of disgust. 
Research also indicates that politically informed individuals have greater 
emotional responses to political messages due to the level of knowledge needed to 
understand such ideas (Almohammad, 2016). This may explain why cognitive 
empathy reduced the effect of disgust in the mediation model. That is, people high in 
cognitive empathy are more likely to regularly engage the slow information 
processing system. People who regularly use the slow processing system are likely to 
have formed stable opinions around political ideals. Therefore, cognitive empathy 
may be a more reliable predictor of political ideologies. That is, there is a stronger 
relationship between cognitive empathy and political ideologies, than disgust and 
political ideologies.  
Limitations 
The current study explicitly assessed the two components of empathy. Results 
provide further evidence of the dissimilarity between cognitive and affective 
empathy, especially in how the concepts relate to disgust and ideologies. It is 
possible that it would have been a better option to run a mediation on the affective 
component, and a moderation using the cognitive component. In order to run a 
mediation, it is recommended that the predictor and mediator variables are related 
(Hayes, 2013). As results of the current research found a lack of association between 
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cognitive empathy and disgust, a moderation would have better examined the 
relation.  
A possible limitation is that data collection was completed online. This meant 
that we are unable to ensure that a high level of effort was maintained from the 
participants, nor were we able to control for extraneous factors such as noise or 
distractibility which may have influenced scores. However, given that it is likely the 
majority of political decisions are a result of fast, emotion based decisions which do 
not require complex cognitive effort (Damasio, 1994; Kahneman, 2011; Way & 
Masters, 1996) these factors may not largely influence the scores.  
There are also limitations which specifically relate to the use of the APIS. 
The scale is yet to be factor analysed or assessed for validity, though there was a 
good distribution of scores (indicating a broad range of attitudes was captured). 
Therefore, despite the promising reliability coefficients it is extremely important to 
interpret the results of this study with caution. Even though our study found no 
differences in political ideologies across age or gender, previous researchers have 
(Blee, 1985; Campbell & Childs, 2013; Cornelis, Van Hiel, Roets, & Kossowska, 
2008). Thus, it may be a limitation to the study that we had a female-majority sample 
with a median age of 19 years. Similarly, the sample consisted solely of Tasmanian 
residents. Consequently, participants of the sample may have differing opinions on 
certain issues compared to people living elsewhere in the country. Furthermore, due 
to comments made by some younger participants, it may be likely they have not yet 
formed stable opinions around the political scale items (in particular, those around 
finance and business). 
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An unequal distribution of males and females in the sample may also explain 
why higher levels of disgust sensitivity were found for males in the current study. 
This finding opposes results found by the majority of researchers as typically females 
possess higher disgust sensitivity (Brenner & Inbar, 2014; Haidt, McCauley, & 
Rozin, 1994; Terrizzi Jr et al., 2010). This may provide evidence that the men of the 
current sample may not hold disgust sensitivities which are representative of those 
possessed by the majority of males.  
It was unexpected to find differences in scores on the APIS according to 
ethnic group. It was especially interesting to see that Caucasians had more liberal 
ideologies. It is often found that migrants tend to vote for parties who favour 
diversity and change (i.e. liberal; Jacobs, Teney, Rea & Delwit, 2016). Conservatism 
is often seen as damaging to the preservation of Asian ideals (Wang, 1998). 
However, the skew may have also reflected the beliefs upheld from participant 
originating country. Wang (1998) noted that some Asian cultures tend to be more 
traditional, and therefore perhaps more conservative.  
Future Research  
As aforementioned, it is recommended that a moderation analysis or other 
approach may be needed to assess the relationship between disgust and cognitive 
empathy, and their impact on political ideology. Results indicate that once cognitive 
empathy was included in the model, disgust no longer related to political ideologies. 
Given this, it would be interesting to assess whether eliciting cognitive empathy in 
the Australian population (i.e. via the media or political campaigns) would take 
precedence over disgust to predict ideologies. That is, people who are high in disgust 
may tend to favour more liberal ideas if we are able to manipulate and increase levels 
of cognitive empathy.  
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As cognitive empathy impacts on political decisions, it may be necessary for 
future researchers to find a way to activate the slow processing system on large scale 
levels. This will allow deeper processing of information and will enhance 
comprehension of complex arguments, possibly resulting in more liberal attitudes. 
Similarly, if researchers/politicians can increase levels of empathy, they are able to 
alter attitudes of people who are high in disgust sensitivity, to vote liberally.  
Evidence shows that quick, emotive decisions often guide political attitudes (Stoker 
et al., 2015). Political attitudes are also believed to be more malleable when they are 
a result of fast processing systems (Hunt, Ergun, & Federico, 2008). Because of this, 
it may be of use to target cognitive empathy as part of an ongoing, long-term goal for 
political parties. In the short term (i.e. leading up to elections) political campaigns 
which use emotion-arousing arguments may be more effective to encourage last 
minute changes to political views.  
Similarly, it would also be of interest to induce both disgust and cognitive 
empathy to see whether the high levels of cognitive empathy supersede the effects of 
the disgust manipulation. Namely, eliciting both cognitive empathy and disgust may 
reveal that regardless of disgust level, cognitive empathy results in liberal attitudes. 
If it is determined in later studies that cognitive empathy does significantly impact on 
the political decisions people make, the next task will be to determine how to 
enhance individuals’ ability to sustain the cognitive effort, commitment and time 
required to activate the slow processing path (Kahneman, 2011).  
It may be of use to control for anxiety levels in future studies, as some 
researchers have found that having high levels of disgust sensitivity is a correlate of 
anxiety (Olatunji & Sawchuck, 2005). It is possible that this will help to further 
explain the variance associated with political ideologies. Research proposes that 
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disgust activates the behavioural immune system, which in turn leads to avoidance of 
disgust cues. It is likely that the possession of high anxiety would lead to the same 
avoidances but with a greater intensity. That is, anxiety may lead to a greater 
adoption of conservatism, in that it may surpass the effects that empathy has on the 
adoption of liberal ideologies.  
It may also be of interest to track the changes in political ideologies over 
time. This may indicate whether the scores on the scale are representative of stable 
beliefs, or subject to trending media issues or even emotionally-manipulative 
political campaigns (i.e. possibly guided by affective empathy processing heuristics). 
Based on the current findings, it may also be of interest to see whether people with 
more liberal views have higher cognitive empathy relative to their emotional 
empathy, and thus do not rely on emotional heuristics as much as those high in 
affective empathy.  
Conclusions  
The current study aimed to determine whether having high levels of empathy 
(either cognitive or affective) mediated the relationship between disgust sensitivity 
and political ideology. It was hypothesised that both affective and cognitive empathy 
would mediate the relationship. It was found that affective empathy partially 
mediated the association, while cognitive empathy did not. The results contribute 
evidence of the importance of emotion and the role it plays in the development of 
these influential beliefs.  This may be explained via the biological and theoretical 
emotion based relationship that both disgust and affective empathy share. That is, 
that the structures of the brain required to produce them are interconnected, and both 
are responsible for creating emotion based responses.  Therefore, the relationship 
between these two variables may be stronger than between disgust and cognitive 
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empathy which relies upon perception/decision making neural networks. Though a 
mediation effect was not established by cognitive empathy, the results propose that 
the inclusion of cognitive empathy resulted in a non-significant relation between 
disgust and political ideologies, and a significant effect of cognitive empathy on 
ideologies.  
We have shown that both cognitive and affective empathy act as mechanisms 
which lead to a greater understanding of the association between disgust sensitivity 
and ideologies. It is thought that this affective-based relation may result in an over 
reliance on heuristics such as ease of processing. It is also believed that political 
attitudes developed based on these heuristics are likely to be less stable (Hunt, Ergun, 
& Federico, 2008). This is illuminated by dual processing models such as the 
heuristic-systematic model of information processing (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). It is 
proposed that cognitive empathy may in fact pose a large contribution to explaining 
ideologies, however these conclusions cannot be drawn until further analyses are 
conducted. Thus, future research should aim to re assess the components of empathy 
using mediation and moderation models, confirm the validity and generalisability of 
the APIS and also assess whether there are any other potential mechanisms which 
influence empathy, or influence the association between disgust and political 
orientations.  
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Appendix A  
Australian Political Ideology Scale 
 
1. Immigrants are a threat to our society 
2. Australia should be allowing more asylum seekers into the country (R) 
3. There are too many immigrants in Australia, so sometimes I feel strange in 
my own country 
4. Islam is a threat to Australian culture 
5. Other religions, such as Islam, enrich our country (R) 
6. Immigrants take the locals’ jobs. 
7. No more mosques should be built in Australia 
8. Immigrants bring more crime 
9. Headscarves are oppressive 
10. It’s better for our society if immigrants keep their own traditions and habits 
11. If you immigrate to Australia, you should learn the language 
12. It’s okay for people to have sex before marriage (R) 
13. Gay couples should be allowed to adopt children (R) 
14. If gay people are allowed to marry in the future, it shouldn’t be called a 
‘marriage’ 
15. People who are openly gay shouldn’t serve in the military 
16. Gay marriage should be legalized (R) 
17. Abortion should be illegal 
18. The Mardi Gras is a positive aspect of Australian culture (R) 
19. In principle, there is nothing wrong with a one-night stand (R) 
20. Saying sorry to the stolen generation was the right thing to do (R) 
21. Aborigines and Torres strait islanders should not get as many benefits as they 
do 
22. Acknowledging the traditional custodians of the land is unnecessary and is 
keeping Australia in the past 
23. Indigenous languages should not be spoken 
24. The date of Australia Day should be changed out of respect for Indigenous 
peoples (R) 
25. Men are better in their work than women 
26. Women are less capable of working than men 
27. I would prefer to have a man in a leadership position than a woman 
28. When women complain about sexism, they frequently just want to work the 
situation to their favor 
29. If a couple has children, it’s better if the woman stays home to raise them 
30. The minimum wage should be raised (R) 
31. It should be easier for employers to fire employees 
32. Unions have too much power in Australian workplaces 
33. It’s fair that people with a higher income pay relatively more taxes than 
people with a lower income (R) 
34. It is important for Australian employees to join a Union (R) 
58 
 
 
 
35. Australia should take their troops out of Syria (R) 
36. Australia should not provide military assistance to foreign countries in the 
war against terrorism (R) 
37. The Australian government isn’t doing enough to prevent radicalization and 
extremism in Australia 
38. The Australian government is spending too much money on foreign 
intervention (R) 
39. The long term gains of Australian troops working in places like Afghanistan 
and Iraq are worthwhile (i.e. teaching them to defend themselves, providing 
security) 
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Appendix B 
Reliability Output for the APIS 
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Appendix C 
Approval Letter 
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Appendix D 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Emotion in Politics:  
Disgust and Empathy Predicting Australian Political Ideology 
You are invited to participant in a research study to assess the relationship between 
disgust sensitivity and political ideology, and whether empathy impacts this 
relationship. The study is completed by Abbey Walker as a part of her psychology 
honours thesis under the supervision of Christine Padgett at the University of 
Tasmania. 
The purpose of the research is to investigate how types of empathy and levels of 
disgust sensitivity lead to a prediction of political views. 
You have been invited to complete this research as you are a member of the KHA116 
practical class, over the age of 18. 
To complete the following research, you will need to provide us with some 
demographic information, and complete three scales. Altogether, this task should 
take around 30 minutes. 
There are no foreseen risks of participating in this study. Benefits of the study will 
include contributing to the body of psychology knowledge which may lead to a better 
understanding of the mechanisms which influence voting choices. This may be 
useful as it will provide an insight into why some people do/do not approve of 
progressive movements (i.e. same sex marriage, immigration). 
All members of the KHA116 class will be asked to complete this research as a part 
of their practical activities. However, if students do not wish to participate, they can 
feel free to withdraw at any time. Similarly, data will be excluded from analysis if 
students do not give consent (located on the demographics form). 
If you have any questions about the nature of the study, or would like to be informed 
of the results following publication, feel free to ask Abbey Walker 
(abbeyw@utas.edu.au) or her supervisor Christine Padgett 
(christine.padgett@utas.edu.au). 
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Appendix E 
Consent and Demographic Information Form 
Consent 
By signing this consent form below,  
 I, ______________________________________ (your name) agree to my data 
being used in this study and understand I can withdraw at any time.  
Signature: ________________________ 
Date: ____/____/_______ 
 
Demographics 
Q1: Is English your first language?  
Yes/No 
Q2: What is your gender? 
• Female 
• Male 
• Would rather not say 
 
Q3: How old are you? 
____________ 
Q4: What is your ethnicity? 
 Aboriginal 
 White/Caucasian 
 Black/African decent 
 Asian 
 Pacific Islander 
 Hispanic 
 
Q5: What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 High school/college 
• Bachelor’s degree 
• Master’s degree 
• Doctorate degree 
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Q6: Are you religious? If so, what religion do you associate yourself with? 
______________________________________________ 
 
 
Q7: How strongly do you associate with this religion? (please circle)  
1= very little, 10= very strongly 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
Voting History 
Q8: What party did you vote for in the last election? If you did not vote in the last 
election, choose what party you think you would have voted for. 
• Labor  
• Liberal 
• Greens 
• Other (please specify) 
 
___________________________________________ 
Q9: How strongly do you associate with this political party? (please circle)  
1= very little, 10= very strongly 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
Q10: If an election happened in the near future would you vote for the same party 
again? (please circle) 
Yes / No 
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Appendix F 
Demographic Breakdown of Scale Scores 
 
In relation to demographic differences of the DS-R scores, the current sample found 
a significant difference between sexes. Males had moderately greater disgust 
sensitivity (M = 13.08, SD = 2.16) than females (M = 12.04, SD = 2.17), t (167) = 
2.39, p = 0.018, Cohen’s d = 0.48, a result inconsistent with previous findings (i.e. 
Brenner & Inbar, 2014; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). No significant differences 
were found across age, strength of religious belief, between ethnicities or whether 
English was their first spoken language, with all significance values > p = .6, and F-
test values < 0.28, these results were in line with those found by previous researchers 
(Inbar, Pizarro & Bloom, 2009).  
Looking at scores across the BES-A scale as a whole, there were no 
significant differences between ethnicities, whether or not English was their first 
language, with t-test values < 0.33, and significance values >.739.  There was also no 
significant relationship of BES-A scores across strength of religiosity or age with r 
values < .10, and significance values > p = .19. A significant difference was found of 
empathy scores between the sexes, with males having moderately lower empathy 
scores (M = 71.83, SD = 8.98) than females (M = 77.27, SD = 9.70), t (168) = -2.82, 
p =.005, Cohen’s d = 0.57, these results were consistent with the majority of previous 
findings (i.e., Carrè et al., 2013; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006). However, other 
researchers have found there to be no sex differences (Cox et al., 2012). Correlation 
between the affective (M = 40.64, SD = 6.85) and cognitive (M = 35.04, SD = 4.71) 
subscales of the BES-A was significant, r(N=170) = .58, p < .001. This relationship 
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is of moderate strength, inferring that the subscales should not be impacted on by 
possible multicollinearity effects.  
There were no significant differences between gender, or levels of completed 
education, or across age with a significance values > p = .172, and all F-values < 
1.78. There was a significant difference between ethnicities, with Caucasians having 
more liberal scores on the APIS (M = 85.69, SD = 17.18) compared to other 
ethnicities (M = 94.05, SD = 18.68), t (168) =-2.02, p=.045, this represented a small 
to moderate effect, Cohen’s d = 0.48. These results are likely to be reflected by the 
marginally large difference found between whether the participant spoke English as 
their first language (M = 85.49, SD =17.06) or not (M = 98.87, SD = 18.15), t (168) 
=-2.88, p = .004, Cohen’s d =.78. These findings were unexpected, as it is common 
for ethnic minorities to favour parties which favour change and accept differences 
(Jacobs, Teney, Rea & Delwit, 2016), themes not commonly associated with 
conservative political parties. Due to the diverse range and small number of 
individuals identifying with ethnicities included in this group, nothing can be drawn 
in relation to a particular cultural difference.  
There was also a significant correlation between measurements of participant 
religiosity (0 = no belief, 10 = strong belief) and APIS scores, r(N=170) =.218, p = 
.004, meaning that as participant level of religiosity increased, so too did their level 
of conservatism. This finding was expected due to findings outlined in previous 
research (Sherkat, Powell-Williams, Maddox, & de Vries, 2011). Due to this result, 
religiosity strength was later entered as a covariate in the mediation model to control 
for the relationship.  
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Appendix G 
SPSS output for Demographic Differences across Scale Scores 
Frequencies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Demographics 
 
 
Differences in scores according to the DS-R, BES-A (cognitive and affective 
subscale scores) and APIS: 
 
Ethnicity: Caucasian vs. other.  
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Religion: Yes, I identify as religious, vs. no I do not identify as religious  
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Gender: Male vs. Female 
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English first language, English second language  
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ANOVA results for education level on APIS 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA results for education level on Cognitive Empathy BES-A scores 
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ANOVA results for education level on Affective Empathy BES-A scores 
 
 
 
ANOVA results for education level on DS-R 
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Correlation for age on the APIS, DSR, cognitive empathy and affective empathy 
BES-A scores 
 
Correlation for strength of religious belief on the APIS, DSR, cognitive empathy and 
affective empathy BES-A scores 
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Appendix H 
Correlation of the BES-A Subscales 
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Appendix I 
Correlation of APIS scores with Strength of Religious Belief 
 
Correlations 
 Strength GRANDPIS 
Strength Pearson Correlation 1 .218** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .004 
N 170 170 
GRANDPIS Pearson Correlation .218** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .004  
N 170 170 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix J 
Descriptive Statistics for Scales Employed 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
Appendix K 
PROCESS Output 
 
Mediation: Affective Empathy 
 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
 
********** PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Release 2.16.1**************** 
 
          Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.       www.afhayes.com 
    Documentation available in Hayes (2013). 
www.guilford.com/p/hayes3 
 
******************************************************************** 
Model = 4 
    Y = GRANDPIS 
    X = DSRGRAND 
    M = AffGRAND 
 
Statistical Controls: 
CONTROL= Strength 
 
Sample size 
        170 
 
******************************************************************** 
Outcome: AffGRAND 
 
Model Summary 
 R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p 
.1951   .0380    45.8905     3.3028     2.0000   167.0000      .0392 
 
Model 
       coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant  46.5687  2.9647    15.7077      .0000    40.7156   52.4218 
DSRGRAND  -.5215   .2359    -2.2105      .0284     -.9872     -.0557 
Strength   .2188   .1691     1.2939      .1975     -.1150      .5526 
 
******************************************************************** 
Outcome: GRANDPIS 
 
Model Summary 
 R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2     p 
.3168      .1004   281.0441     6.1725     3.0000   166.0000  .0005 
 
Model 
        coeff         se       t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant   119.4793  11.5480  10.3463    .0000    96.6793   142.2793 
AffGRAND   -.4559     .1915    -2.3808   .0184     -.8340     -.0778 
DSRGRAND    -1.4139   .5923    -2.3872   .0181    -2.5833     -.2445 
Strength    1.3337    .4205     3.1716   .0018      .5034     2.1640 
 
*********************** TOTAL EFFECT MODEL************************** 
Outcome: GRANDPIS 
 
Model Summary 
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R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p 
.2639   .0696   288.9001     6.2500     2.0000   167.0000      .0024 
 
Model 
           coeff     se        t         p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant   98.2477   7.4386    13.2078  .0000    83.5618   112.9336 
DSRGRAND   -1.1762   .5919    -1.9871   .0486    -2.3448     -.0076 
Strength   1.2340    .4242     2.9087   .0041      .3964     2.0715 
 
************ TOTAL, DIRECT, AND INDIRECT EFFECTS******************* 
 
Total effect of X on Y 
     Effect         SE          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
    -1.1762      .5919    -1.9871      .0486    -2.3448     -.0076 
 
Direct effect of X on Y 
     Effect         SE          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
    -1.4139      .5923    -2.3872      .0181    -2.5833     -.2445 
 
Indirect effect of X on Y 
             Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
AffGRAND      .2378      .1899      .0042      .7600 
 
Partially standardized indirect effect of X on Y 
             Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
AffGRAND      .0139      .0111      .0002      .0441 
 
Completely standardized indirect effect of X on Y 
             Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
AffGRAND      .0307      .0236      .0006      .0952 
 
Ratio of indirect to total effect of X on Y 
             Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
AffGRAND     -.2021     4.5000    -2.8702      .0178 
 
Ratio of indirect to direct effect of X on Y 
             Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
AffGRAND     -.1682      .9917     -.9319      .0025 
 
**************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND WARNINGS************************ 
 
Number of bootstrap samples for bias corrected bootstrap confidence 
intervals: 
     5000 
 
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output: 
    95.00 
 
------ END MATRIX ----- 
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Appendix L 
PROCESS Output 
Mediation: Cognitive Empathy  
 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
 
**********PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Release 2.16.1***************** 
 
          Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.       www.afhayes.com 
    Documentation available in Hayes (2013). 
www.guilford.com/p/hayes3 
 
******************************************************************** 
Model = 4 
    Y = GRANDPIS 
    X = DSRGRAND 
    M = CogGRAND 
 
Statistical Controls: 
CONTROL= Strength 
 
Sample size 
        170 
 
******************************************************************** 
Outcome: CogGRAND 
 
Model Summary 
  R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2      p 
.0906      .0082    19.8601      .6914     2.0000   167.0000   .5023   
 
Model 
          coeff       se          t          p       LLCI     ULCI     
constant 34.3635    1.9503     17.6192    .0000     30.5130  38.2140   
DSRGRAND .0366      .1552      .2356      .8140     -.2698     .3430   
Strength .1283      .1112      1.1539     .2502     -.0913     .3479  
 
******************************************************************** 
Outcome: GRANDPIS 
 
Model Summary 
   R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2       p    
 .3203      .1026   280.3538     6.3239     3.0000   166.0000 .0004  
 
Model 
              coeff    se       t          p    LLCI     ULCI 
constant   122.9047  12.3900  9.9196   .0000    98.4423   147.3671 
CogGRAND   -.7175    .2907    -2.4680  .0146    -1.2916  -.1435    
DSRGRAND   -1.1499   .5832    -1.9718  .0503    -2.3014   .0015 
Strength     1.3261  .4196     3.1605  .0019      .4977  2.1545 
 
********************** TOTAL EFFECT MODEL************************** 
Outcome: GRANDPIS 
 
Model Summary 
 R       R-sq     MSE        F      df1        df2      p 
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.2639   .0696   288.9001   6.2500   2.0000  167.0000    .0024 
 
Model 
           coeff     se         t          p       LLCI     ULCI 
constant    98.2477   7.4386   13.2078    .0000   83.5618   112.9336 
DSRGRAND    -1.1762   .5919    -1.9871    .0486   -2.3448     -.0076 
Strength     1.2340   .4242    2.9087     .0041    .3964     2.0715 
 
*************** TOTAL, DIRECT, AND INDIRECT EFFECTS***************** 
Total effect of X on Y 
     Effect         SE          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
    -1.1762      .5919    -1.9871      .0486    -2.3448     -.0076 
 
Direct effect of X on Y 
     Effect         SE          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
    -1.1499      .5832    -1.9718      .0503    -2.3014      .0015 
 
Indirect effect of X on Y 
             Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
CogGRAND     -.0262      .1173     -.3110      .1947 
 
Partially standardized indirect effect of X on Y 
             Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
CogGRAND     -.0015      .0069     -.0180      .0114 
 
Completely standardized indirect effect of X on Y 
             Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
CogGRAND     -.0034      .0150     -.0408      .0243 
 
Ratio of indirect to total effect of X on Y 
             Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
CogGRAND      .0223      .6655     -.2707      .5164 
 
Ratio of indirect to direct effect of X on Y 
             Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
CogGRAND      .0228      .6994     -.2238      .7008 
 
******************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND WARNINGS******************** 
 
Number of bootstrap samples for bias corrected bootstrap confidence 
intervals: 
     5000 
 
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output: 
    95.00 
 
------ END MATRIX ----- 
 
 
 
 
 
